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THE WELFARE  ECONOMICS OF DEBT  SERVICE 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyzes  some of the implications  of the dual  transfer a 
debtor nation  must  undertake  to service foreign debt:  (a)  an internal  transfer 
from  the private  sector  to the public  sector;  and (b) an external  transfer 
from  the domestic  economy  to foreign  creditors.  It shows  that,  under  likely 
circumstances,  a real depreciation  of  the home currency may complicate  the 
internal  transfer.  As long as non-traded  goods are a net source of revenue 
for the government,  the depreciation  called  for by debt service  deteriorates 
the public  sector's  terms  of  trade vis-a-vis  the private  sector  and magnifies 
the requisite  fiscal  retrenchment.  The paper  discusses  the role  of trade 
policy  (tariffs and export  subsidies)  in substituting  for devaluation. 
Generating  a private-sector  surplus via interest-rate  policy  is shown  to have 
similar  costs on the government  budget when  the public  sector  has outstanding 
domestic  debt. 
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I.  Introduction 
Since the onset  of the debt  crisis  in  1982,  the requirement  of prompt 
debt service  hss overwhelmed  many other  traditional  objectives  of government 
policy  in highly-indebted  countries.  The virtusi  hslt in commercial  bank 
lending has reversed  the sign of net resource  inflows to developing  countries, 
necessitating  the transfer  abroad  of several percentage  points  of CUP 
annually.  A reverse transfer  of such  magnitude  has required  a retrenchment  in 
domestic  expenditures  and sharp  changes  in relative  prices,  which  have proved 
particularly  costly  in  terms  of capital  formation  and (it would  appear)  income 
distribution. 
Debt aervice  typically  involves  two kinds  of  transfers.  Commonly, 
foreign  debt is largely  the liability  of the public  sector,  whereas  the main 
source of foreign exchange  earnings is the private  sector.  Consequently,  it 
is now well-recognized  that  debt service  entaila an internal  transfer  of 
resources  from  the private  sector  to the public  sector,  alongside  the 
external  transfer  from  the latter  to foreign  creditors.'  As in the two-gap 
style  of analysis,  the level  of debt service is constrained  by whichever  of 
the  two transfers  happens  to  bind.  When the internal  tranafer  is the binding 
constraint,  for example,  the inability  of the government  to raise  reaourcea 
will  be reflected  in an ex-ante  private-sector  surplus,  which in equilibrium 
may dissipate itself via such  channels  as capital  flight,  inflation,  or 
1.  This point  has been made forcefully  by Jeffrey  Sachs.  See, for example, 
Sacha  (1987,  pp.  21-22).  See also Dornbusch  (1985,  pp. 348-352). -2- 
increased  private  consumption. 
Another way of atating  the same issue  ia that debt service  entails  a 
public-finance  problem  intertwined  with  a transfer  problem.  The  economy has 
to generate a surplus  of traded  goods,  and the government  has to extract 
additional  resources  from the private  sector.  The  internal-transfer  aspect, 
in  turn,  raises  interesting  issues  for one reason  alone,  and that is that the 
requisite  fiscal  retrenchment  it[këly to  be costly. 
Of course,  the cynical  view is that the burden  of fiscal contraction  will 
be borne by scheming  bureaucrats  and bloated  government  programs,  and that it 
will therefore  contribute  a net gain to social  welfare.  But a more balanced 
appraisal  would  be that a quick turnaround  in  the fiscal stance  is likely  to 
generate important  social  inefficencies.  There  are plenty  of reasons  for 
this.  First,  and most obviously,  any increase  in  taxes will be accompanied  by 
their usual allocstive  distortions.  On the expenditure  side,  since  an 
importsnt  component  of current  spending  is targeted  on social  equity 
objectives,  a squeeze  on such  spending  will likely  reduce  social  welfare.  A 
reduction in public investment  expenditures,  the most likely  initial  casualty 
of an increse  in debt service obligations,  will  jeopardize  capital formation 
and future  growth.  If  the public  sector  resorts  to the inflation  tax and/or 
domestic  borrowing  instead,  the stage  may be set either  for an explosion  in 
inflation  or for a sharp  rise in real interest  rates  that might put the 
domestic  debt on an unsustainable  course. 
This  paper  works out some  of the implications  of the co-existence  of the 
internal  transfer  with the external one.  In section  II below,  I  show in  the -3- 
context of a simple  small-open  economy  model how any increase  in debt-service 
must be accompanied  by an enlarged  extraction  of  private  resources  by the 
public sector.  I also show that in the absence  of fiscal  retrenchment,  the 
impact  of a devaluation  on debt  service will be annulled  by domestic 
inflation,  capital  flight, or  both.  Section  III discusses  in more detail  the 
welfare costs of debt service when fiscal retrenchment  is costly.  The key 
point here is that the external  transfer  involves  a neglected  additional  cost: 
the real exchange-rate  depreciation  called  for by debt  service  deteriorates 
the public  sector's  terms  of  trade vis-a-vis  the private  sector,  and magnifies 
the requisite  fiscal  retrenchment.  Drawing  an analogy  with the literature  on 
the transfer  problem,  debt service  involves  a "secondary  burden"  for the 
domestic  economy,  not because  the country's  external  terms of trade 
deteriorate  (which  they don't  in  a small country  context)  but because  the 
internal terms  of trade move  against  the public  sector. 
In section  IV,  I discuss  some  intertemporal  issues  in a two-period 
version of the model.  I stress that  bringing  debt service  forward  in time has 
an additional  welfare  cost when,  as is common,  the domestic  interest  rates 
exceed the interest  rates on foreign  debt.  Moreover,  with pre-existing 
domestic  government  debt,  early  repayment  of foreign  debt  further  deteriorates 
the public  sector  budget  (and  welfare)  by pushing  domestic  real interest  rates 
up.  Section  V discusses  the role  that trade  policy,  and in particular  tariffs 
and export  subsidies,  can play in  alleviating  the welfare  loss.  Not 
surprisingly,  a small  level of tariffs  is found  to be welfare  enhancing,  both 
because  tariffs  raise  government  revenue  and because they  partially  substitute 
for  (costly)  real depreciation.  Paradoxically,  however,  export  subsidies  can 
increase  welfare as  well,  when targeted  on non-traditional  exports  with large -4- 
supply  elasticities,  since  their beneficial  role  in substituting  for real 
depreciation  can offset  their  direct  budgetary  burden.  Finally,  section  VI 
provides  some concluding  comments. 
II. The Imolicationa  of the Twin  Transfers 
We start  with the simplest  model of  a small  open  economy.  The economy 
produces  two kind of  goods,  traded  goods  (with price  e)  and non-traded  goods 
(with price  p).  The real exchange  rate  is the conventional  one,  given  by e/p. 
The government  does  not engage  in  production,  nor does  its behavior affect 
private sector  welfare  directly.  Ita primary  aurplua  (i.e. excluding  debt 
service)  as a share of gross  domestic  product  is given  by r.  In the simplest 
case,  we could think of this as a uniform  production  (or value  added) tax at 
rate r.  More generally,  we will  not be particularly  concerned  with the 
specification  of taxes and government  expenditures,  letting  r denote  simply 
the net resource  transfer  from the private  to the public  sector (aa a share  of 
GDP).  The implicit  asaumption  here is that the government's  pattern of 
revenues  and expenditures  (excluding  debt service)  match  that of the private 
sector.  This seems  like the natural  assumption  to make.  In any case,  ae will 
be explained  below,  the results hold for much  more general  apecificationa. 
Since  the model  of this section  is static, we assume chat the private  and 
public  sectors  have (exogenous)  debt-service  requirements  of  and 
tg (in 
terms  of traded  goods),  respectively.  We let E(e, p, V) stand  for the private 
sector's  expenditure  function,  with V denoting  the level of private (and for 
now,  social) welfare.  The supply  side  of the economy  is described  by the 
revenue  (or COP)  function  R(e, p).  Then the following  three  equations 
determine  fully  the equilibrium  of the economy: -5- 
(1)  E(e, p  V) — (l-r)R(e,  p) 
- eB 
(2)  Re 
- 
Ee 
—  + 
(3)  rR(e,  p) — 
eBg 
- 
The  first  of these  states  the income-expenditure  identity  for the private 
sector.  The  second  uses the fact thst  partisl  derivatives  of expenditure  and 
revenue  functions  yield the relevant  (compensated)  demand  and supply  functions 
to state  the balance-of  payments  identity.  Notice  that  the private  sector, 
the only productive  sector  of the economy, has to generate  the traded-goods 
surplus  to service  both the government  and its own foreign  liabilities. 
Equation  (3) ,  in turn,  states  the public-sector  budget identity:  the 
government's  primary  surplus  has  to equal its debt  service.  The equlibriuju 
condition  for the non-traded  goods  market need  not be stated  separately,  as 
(by Walrss'  law) it is already  implied by (l)-(3). 
Notice that since  only relative  prices matter,  we could  have stated  the 
system  in terms of the real exchange  rate  (e/p) alone, as will be done in the 
following  sections.  For now,  I keep e and p separate,  as they  will have the 
convenient  interpretations  of "nominal"  exchange  rate policy  and the economy's 
response  to it, respectively,  for the kind of exercises  to be carried  out in 
the present  section. 
The system  above  represents  three  independent  equations  that  will 
determine  three variables,  of which  V is one.  What the other  two endogenous 
variables  are depends  on the question  of interest.  Suppose,  the objective  of 
policy  is to service  an additional  amount of public  debt,  dEg. 
Assume 
further,  with no loss of generality  (as only  e/p matters),  that p  is fixed  at 
unity.  B 
is outside  the government's  control.  Then achieving  the target -6- 
increase  in public  debt service  requires not only an  exchange-rate  policy  (a 
real depreciation),  but an increase  in  r, the public  aector  surplus.  In  other 
words,  e and r both have to be endogenously  determined,  given S. 
To see the nature  of the interrelationships,  we differentiate  totally  (I) 
-(3).  After substituting  out for dy--we will return  to welfare  effects  in the 
next section--we  are  left with a system  in two endogenous  variables,  e and r: 
(rR,)/e 
R  de  -e 
(4)  dBg• 
ee 
- 
Ree)  0  dr 
-(l-tccy) 
Here  denotes  the share of tradables  consumption  in COP  (eEe/R) and 
cty 
denotes  the income elasticity  of demand  for tradables,  so that 
(l-rircty) 
is 
positive.  The determinant  of the system, denoted  by A  R(Ree 
-  is also 
positive  since  E(.)  is (strictly)  concave and R(.)  (strictly)  convex  in a. 
The real  exchange  rate depreciation  called  for by the increased  debt service 
requirement  can  be cslculsted  as: 




This  is the conventional  depreciation  required  to get the economy  to generate 
the additional  traded  goods;  r sppears nowhere  in this expression. 
The new aspect,  of course,  is that alongside  the depreciation,  the 
external  transfer  requires  an increase  in  the public  sector  primary  surplus: 
(6)  dT/dBg 
— (1/A)  [e(Ree 
- 
Eec)  +  (l-itccy)CrRp/e)] 
> 0. 
(a)  (b) 
Using the definition  of  A, we note  that the elasticity  of  r with respect  to 
the debt service  requirement  exceeds  unity: (6')  (dr/r)/(dBg/Sg) 
— 1  +  - 
Eee)J1(17tCty)rRp  > 1. 
This  is beacause the increase  in r has two components.  The first,  labeled 
(a) ,  is  simply  the value  of the additional  traded  goods  generated  in the 
economy (excluding  the income  effect).2  The government  surplus has to rise 
one-for-one  to transfer  these  traded  goods abroad.  But, there is a second 
effect,  labeled  (b),  which represents  the public-sector  income  loss that  has 
to be made up as a consequence  of the deterioration  of the government's  terms 
of trade vis-a-vis the private  sector.  This income  loss  is proportional  to 
the rate of  depreciation--compare  equation  (5)--and  to rR.  R 
is the 
economy's  output  of non-traded  goods  and r  is  the government's  net claim on it 
(as a share  of  output).  Hence,  as long  as the public  sector's  revenues  from 
non-traded  goods  exceed  its expenditures  on them,  the real depreciation 
required  to generate  the private-sector  surplus  has an additional  burden  on 
the public  budget.3  The requirement  would be clearly  satisfied  when 
government  expenditures  are nil,  and r represents  the economy-wide  tax rate. 
More generally,  we can think of r  as a vector  of "net"  tax rates  on 
commodities,  i.e.  revenues  from each group of commodities js  expenditures. 
Then,  a real depreciation  entails  an  income loss for the public sector  (and an 
2.  This can be seen from the total  differential  of equation  (2):  (ReeEee) 
- 
EeVdV  dBg.  The  second  term on the left-hand  side is the income  effect  on 
demand  for tradables. 
3.  Dornbusch  (1987)  expresses  the budget  deficit in reduced form  as an 
increasing  function  of the real  exchange  rate,  arguing  that "the real value  of 
the service  of an external  debt contracted  in dollars will increase  when the 
real exchange  rate depreciates"  (p.  68).  As the discussion  in the text shows, 
the former  does not necessarily  follow from the latter,  as compensating 
increases  in real revenues  (and declines  in real expenditures  on non-debt 
items) also have to be taken into account. -8- 
offseting  gain for the private  aector)  whenever  the non-traded  gooda component 
of thia vector  is positive.  For a government  that  has to generate  a primary 
surplus,  this will likely  be the case.4 Notice  that  what is tequired  here is 
only that non-traded  goods  be a source  of  gg. revenue  for the government;  with 
respect  to traded goods,  the primary  budget  of the government  could  be either 
in surplus  or in  deficit.5  When such is the case,  then,  a real depreciation 
worsens  the government  budget  and requires  an increase  in the rate of taxation 
(or a reduction  in the level of expenditures)  to offaet  it.  We will return  to 
the welfare  implications  of this  in the next section. 
Since  debt service  depends both on the government's  exchange-rate  policy 
and on its resource-mobilization  policy, a relevant  question  is what happens 
when the government  fails on one of  the two fronts.  The more interesting  case 
is the one where  exchange-rate  policy  is not supplemented  by a sufficient 
increase  in the primary  surplus  of the government.  This is a realistic 
scenario  since, as shown  above,  the government  now has  to generate  additional 
income not only to accomplish  the transfer  abroad,  but also to restore  the 
4.  To see  this, suppose  that non-tradables  make up 70 percent  of the economy. 
Assume,  contrary  to the case envisaged  here,  that non-tradables  are not a net 
source of revenue for the government.  Then,  to generate  a primary  surplus  of 
five percent  (of GOP),  the government  would  have to impose  a "net"  tax rate of 
at least  16.7 percent  (O.O5/[l-O.7])  on  tradables.  Of  course,  in countries 
where government  revenues  derive  to a large  extent  from  exports  of natural 
resources,  the presumption  would be that the effect  of real depreciations  go 
the other  way. 
5.  Of course,  the overall budget identity  requires  that the government  have a 
deficit in traded  goods  if it  has s surplus  in non-traded  goods.  But when the 
relevant  budgetary  concept  is the primary  budget  (revenues  and expenditures 
excluding  debt service),  the government  can, and typically  will,  have a 
simultaneous  surplus  in both traded  and non-traded  goods. -9- 
erosion of its real  revenue  base as a consequence  of the real depreciation. 
When such  resource  mobilization  proves  impossible,  the internal  transfer 
becomes the binding  constraint  on debt service.  The question  is:  how does  the 
economy  then adjust to equate  the ex-post surplus  of  the private  sector with 
the ex-post  transfer  from it to the public  sector? 
With  no loss of generality,  suppose that r is now fixed.  (Any  level  of r 
that falls  short  of the requirement  expressed  in (6) will do.)  If the level 
of public  debt  service 
(ag) 
is also taken as exogenous,  the system  expressed 
in (l)-(3) clearly  becomes  under-determined.  There  is no way to guarantee 
that  a pre-specified  level of Bg 
can be transferred  abroad. 
The following  thought  experiment  illustrates  the likely  consequences  for 
the economy.  Suppose  the government  depreciates  the "nominal"  exchange  rate 
(de > 0)  with a view towards  acomplishing  the external  transfer,  but that r 
remains  unchanged.  The level  of public  debt  service,  now can be viewed  as 
an endogenous consequence  of (exogenous)  exchange-rate  policy.  What are the 
two other  endogenous  variables?  V is clearly one such  variable.  With respect 
to the other,  however,  the system  expressed  in (l)-(3) allows  us a choice  of p 
or  I  take up each in turn. 
Case  1:  Inflation.  In the first  case, we treat private sector  capital 
inflows/outflows  as exogenous,  but allow  the nominal  price  of non-traded  goods 
to move.  The outcome  is now obvious.  It can  be checked  easily  that all 
variables  of interest  (V and 
Bg 
in  particular)  are homogeneous  of degree  zero 
in prices.  Therefore, the new  equilibrium is  given by  dp/p 
—  de/e and 
dBg 
— 
dV  * 0; exchange  rate policy is  undone  by  a proportional rise in domestic 
prices,  and the initial  nominal  depreciation  ends  up transferring  no 
additional  resources  abroad.  It is inflation which eliminates  the ex-ante  gap -10- 
between  the private  sector  surplus and the  (unchanged)  government  primary 
surplus.6  In  a real  model like this one, the real transfer  of resources 
abroad  remains  unaffected.  But in  a monetary  framework,  the nominal 
devaluation  would  be tantamount  to an expansion  of the money  supply, and the 
consequent  inflation  would generate some seignorage  revenues.  This in turn 
would  allow some  incresse  in the level of the external  transfer,  although  not 
by the full amount  intended  by the devsluation. 
Csse 2:  Csoital  Flight.  To see how the alternative  adjustment  mechanism 
works,  we now hold p fixed  snd allow B, 
to  vary.  I will auggest  an 
interpretation  for this scenario  below.  The endogenous  variables  that respond 
to changes  in  e now are V, B, end Bg. 
Under these conditions,  the effect on 
public  debt service  can be ascertained  directly  from (3): 
(7)  dBg 
— -(r5/e2)de. 
In  words,  the external  transfer  of the public  sector  now  ,  by  the full 
amount  of its terms-of-trade  deterioration.  The public  aector  has been 
impoverished  by the real depreciation  and has to reduce  ita debt service. 
What is the outcome  for B? 
Remember  that B 
is the private  sector's  debt 
service; it is the net reduction  in the private  sector's  foreign  liabilities, 
or alternatively  the net increase  in its foreign  assets.  Solving  the system 
for B  yields: 
(8)  dB/de 
— ((Ree 





6.  In a discussion  of Brazil's  case, Cohen  seems  to suggest  that  inflation  is 
a symptom  of a more successful  adjustment  on the external  front  than on  the 
internal  front.  This can  be interpreted  along  the lines  sketched  out  in  the 
text.  See Cohen (1988,  pp. 93-94). -11- 
The exchange-rate  depreciation  leads  to a build-up  of the private  sectors  net 
foreign  assets.  There  are two additive  effects here moving  in the same 
direction.  First,  the depreciation  allows  the private  sector  to generate  a 
surplus  of traded  goods  (first term  in curly brackets),  which can be used for 
capital flight  in  the abs'nce  of an increased  rate of taxation.  Second,  the 
depreciation  also  increases  the real income of the private  sector  by shrinking 
the real "tax  base"  (second term in  curly brackets)  ,  and  this  net increase  in 
income  can also  be used to build  up asaets  abroad.  Consequently,  the 
resulting  capital  flight is larger than  the public  debt-service  which would 
have occurred  had r  been increased  alongside  e.7  This is one possible 
interpretation  of how substantial  real devaluations  and trade surpluses  can 
co-exist,  ss in  Mexico in  1984-85,  with  no improvement  in  the overall debt 
situation. 8 
One does not need s fancy dynamic  model  to generate  this  capital-flight 
possibility  as an equilibrium  outcome  of an inter-temporal  decision  framework. 
Suppose  the domestic  interest  rates  are fixed by arbitrage  with foreign 
capital  markets.  With sluggish  adjustment  in  p  the devslustion  generates  an 
ex-snte  excess  savings  in the private  sector.9  Since  domestic  interest  rates 
7.  The  terminology  I  use here is clearly  not without  normative  overtones:  a 
decrease  in the public  sector's  net foreign  liabilities  is called  "debt 
service",  whereas  an analogous  change  for the private  sector  is called 
"capital  flight."  This is common  terminology,  however. 
8.  See Sachs  (1987), p. 22. 
9.  Of course,  it is not immediately  clear  that the devaluation  on its own 
d generate  additional  private  savings  in  s dynamic  framework.  I  consider 
this  case  because  a devaluation  policy  makes  sense  only  when it does.  Perhaps 
the simplest  case to consider  is the one with unemployed  resources  in  the -12- 
cannot  fall,  the excess  savings  are used to build up foreign assets. 
These  two cases  are of  course only illustrations  of  the possible  outcomes 
that await  a policy  which tackles the external  transfer  without  tackling  the 
internal  one.  A well-intentioned  exchange  rate  policy  can be dissipated  in 
inflation  and/or  capital  flight in  the absence  of adequate public-sector 
resource  mobilization.  Significantly,  the real  depreciation  aggravates  the 
requisite  resource mobilization,  as it deteriorates  the public  sector's  terma 
of trade via-a-via  the private  sector. 
In  the absence  of a more fully articulated  model,  it is impossible  to 
tell exactly  what  combination  of inflation  and capital  flight  will actually 
occur.  In particular,  a serious  treatment  of capital  flight requires  an 
intertemporal  framework.  Nonetheless,  the central  point  is clear even in this 
simple  framework:  when it is not accompanied  by fiscal  tightening,  the 
"appropriate"  exchange-rate  policy  can end up validating  an ex-ante  motive for 
capital  flight,  and be inflationary. 
III. Welfare  Consequences  of Debt Service 
The previous  section  analyzed  the circumatancea  under which a specified 
level  of debt service  could be accomplished.  The present  section  concentrates 
on the welfare  consequences  of doing  so.  Accordingly,  in what follows  I will 
assume  that the requisite  public-sector  resource  mobilization  always  takes 
economy.  The devaluation  would then  spur  domestic  income  and increase 
savings.  Alternatively,  the devaluation  could  be viewed  as a temporary 
increase in the price of traded  goods, in which  case consumers  would  want to 
transfer  some of their consumption  to the second  period  provided the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution  is sufficiently  larger  than the 
intra-temporal  substitution  elasticity.  See Svenaaon  and Razin (1983)  for a 
discussion  of the issues. -13- 
place.  The question  I pose is:  what is the welfare  cost of an additional  unit 
of debt service,  when fiscal retrenchment  is a source  of social inefficiency? 
The previous  section  did  not explicitly  allow for changes  in r  to have 
direct  welfare  consequences.  As pointed  out in  the introduction,  the nature 
of the costs  imposed  by ai increase  in  r is generally  a source of debate. 
These  costs  can range all the way from the traditional  allocative  distortions 
imposed  by tax wedges  to wider political  costs  engendered  by shifts  in 
governmental  priorities,  entitlements,  and income  distribution.  Given the 
broad spectrum  of  issues  involved here,  I  prefer  to take an agnostic  view and 
model these  costs  in a general  but ad-hoc  manner.  I write social  welfare  as 
follows: 
(9)  W — V  - (r),  ' > 0,  '  >  0. 
The  cost  of  fiscal tightening  enters  additively  in the social welfare 
function.  This implies  that, as a first  approximation,  the  impact of fiscal 
policy  on relative  prices  can be ignored.  For all its disadvantages,  this 
specification  avoids misplaced  concreteness  of  the sort  that  would prevail  had 
we attributed  the costs  to a well-specified,  but particular  source. 
The rest  of the model  remains  as  before,  with three  cosmetic  changes. 
First, we arbitrarily  set the price of traded  goods  to  unity,  with  p now 
denoting  the  inverse of the real exchange  rate.  Second, we denote  by B the 
total  debt service  requirement  of the economy,  with - the  public  sector's 
share  in it.  I will treat both B and y parametrically.  Third, we replace  the 
balance-of-payments  identity with the condition  for equilibrium  in the non- -14- 
traded  goods  market.  The rest of  the model  can now he written as follows: 
(10)  E(l, p  V) — (l-r)R(l, p) 
-  (1-7)3 
(11) 
-  —  0 
(12)  rR(l,  p)  — -yE. 
The  four endogenous  variables  are p,  r,  V  and W. 
We investigate  the consequences  of an increase  in the debt-service 
obligations  of the economy.  As discussed  in the previoua section,  the real 
exchange  rate  has to  depreciate,  and the analogue  of expression  (5)  in  the 
present  context  ia: 





t7n  is the share  of  non-trsdsbles  production  in  GDP,  and 
cny 
is the income 
elasticity  of demand  for non-tradsbles.  The change  in private  welfare  is 
given by: 
(14)  dV/dB  — -A C 0, 
where A  (— 1tv is the orivate marginal  utility  of income.  Eut social 
welfare is also  a function  of what  happens  to r: 
(15)  dW/dB  — dV/dE - 'dr/dB 
— -(A + ('/R)[y 
- 
r%(dp/dB)J} 
<  -A < 0. 
where dp/dB is as expressed  in (13)  .  The  expression  in  curly  brackets  can  be 
interpreted  as  the social  marginal  utility  of  income,  and is higher than the 
private marginal  utility  of income  beceause  transferring  resources  from  the 
private to the public  sector  is costly.  Notice  that the wedge between  the -15- 
private  and social  valuations  of income has two components.  One psrt  has to 
do with the direct  increase  in the requisite  internal  transfer,  and is 
proportional  to -y,  the ahare  of the public  sector  in  total  foreign 
liabilities.  The other part captures  the social  valuation  of the public 
sector's real income  loss  as a result  of the real  depreciation,  and is 
proportional  to the rate of the depreciation. 
Therefore,  the social  cost  of debt  service  is magnified  whenever  the 
public sector  holds  foreign  debt, or when  non-rradables  are a net source  of 
revenue  for the public  sector.  Typically  both set of circumstances  will 
apply.  The determinants  of the magnitude  of the welfare  cost can be read from 
(13)  and (15):  the welfare  cost  of debt service  increases  with the share of 
debt  held by the public  sector  (-y),  the size of the primary  surplus of the 
government,  and the share  of non-traded  goods  in the economy;  it decreases 
with the extent  of price-responsiveness  in the economy. 
There  is an interesting  parallel  here  with the literature  on the transfer 
problem.10  It is well-known  from this literature  that  a transfer  from one 
country to another involves  a "secondary burden" for the donor  country insofar 
as the transfer  requires  a deterioration  in its terms-of-trade,  which it will 
if  the  sum of the marginal  propensities  to import fall short  of  unity.  Here 
there  is a similar  secondary  burden,  except that this arises  from  a change  not 
in the external terma  of trade, but in  the internal  rerms  of trade.  When 
fiscal  retrenchment  is  costly,  a unit  of income  in  the public  sector  is 
socially  more valuable than  a unit of income in the private  sector.  The 
problem with the real depreciation  is that it transfers  income  in the wrong 
10.  For a discussion  and references,  see Jones  and Neary (1984, pp.  7-9). -16- 
IV. The Role  of Domestic Debt 
The secondary  burden  of debt  service does  not arise  solely  from a real 
exchange  rate depreciation.  A rather  similar scenario  is played  out, for a 
different  reason, when the government has a pre-existing  stock  of domestic 
debt.  To see this,  we now turn  to an  alternative  mechanism  for generating  a 
private  sector  surplus:  an increase in  the domestic  real interest  rate. 
Typically,  real interest rates  will be jacked  up alongside  devaluations,  but 
in the present  section  we will look  at  the first  alone.  cJe will see that  the 
requisite  rise in interest  rates deteriorates  the public  sector's  terms of 
trade  in  much the same way that a real depreciation  does. 
To abstract  from real exchange rate  movements,  I simplify  the model  above 
by lumping  traded  and non-traded  goods into a single  domestic  good.  The 
inclusion  of a second period (the future),  to capture  simple  savings  dynamics, 
compensates  for the simplification.  Therefore  the modified  model still has 
two goods:  today's  goods and tomorrow's  goods.  The relative  price  of future 
goods is denoted  by 6, which is also the economy's  real discount  factor  (one 
over one plus the real consumption  rate of  interest).  The government  enters 
period  one with a pre-exiating  net stock of domestic  debt  D0, which  comes  due 
in  the second  (and  last) period.  It can undertake  an additional  amount  D of 
new domestic  borrowing (or amortization  if D is negative)  during  period  one. 
The private  sector  cannot  borrow  from or lend  abroad. 
Under these  conditions,  the model  is given  by: 
(16)  E(l,  6, V) — (1-r1)q1 + &(l-r2)q2  + 17- 
(17)  q1 -  —  9B 
(18)  r1q1  + D  — 
(19)  r2q2 — 
(D+D0)/5  + (19)B/5*. 
By appeal  to full employment,  we fix the level of output  in the two periods 
q1 and q2.  B refers  to the outstanding  stock  of foreign debt  held  by the 
public  sector;  9 is  the share which  comes due in the first period.  Equation 
(17)  is the goods-market  equilibrium  for the first period; the analogous 
expression  for the second  period can be left  out because of  Walras'  law. 
Equations  (18) and (19) are the public  sector budget  constraints  for the two 
periods,  with  and  denoting  the respective  primary  surpluses  (as a share 
of GDP)  Since  the  foreign  real  interest  rate  can differ  from the domestic 
one,  different  discount  factors apply  to domestic  and foreign debt in 
expression  (19).  Notice  that there are five possible  endogenous  variables 
here (V,  6,  D, r1, and r2), but only  four equations.  It is convenient  to  use 
the extra  degree  of freedom to  set  —  —  r.  This  does  not restrict  the 
governments ability  to  shift  resources  from  one period  to the other,  as this 
can still be achieved  via changes  in  D.  Alternatively,  we could have fixed 
to examine  the implications  of debt  service  for the long-run  level  of 
fiscal  stringency.  The qualitative  results discussed  below  are not affected 
by the "normalization'  we select here. 
In this  intertemporal  framework,  the relevant  question  to pose about the 
burden  of debt  service  is: what are the consequences  of  a shift  forward  in 
time of the stream  of service payments?  Earlier  repayment  of foreign  debt  car 
be here captured  by an increase  in  6.  The implications  for welfare  are then -18- 
easy to  calculate: 
(20)  dV/dO  — A((5/6*)  - 1JB, 
where  A is once again  the (private)  marginal utility  of income.  The term  in 
square brackets  can also  be written  as (r* -  r)/(l+r)  ,  with r* and r standing 
for the foreign  and domestic  (real)  interest rates,  respectively.  As long as 
domestic  interest  rates  exceed  the world  rate-  -or, more precisely,  the average 
rate  on foreign  liabilities- -earlier  repayment  of debt is welfare  worsening. 
The reason  is straightforward:  the present value of repayments  discounted  at 
the domestic  rate of interest  jg, even though  it remains  constant  when 
discounted  at S.  Put differently,  with  r > r*,  the home country  is borrowing 
too little  in  the first  period  to begin  with;  a larger  resource  transfer  early 
on  exacerbates  this distortion. 
The effect  on the domestic  interest rate  can be found  similarly: 
(21)  di  (l/E12)  [Me  + E1vdV] 
the sign of which is in general ambiguous  as the  -substitution  and income 
effects  go in  opposite  directions.  On  the one hand,  the increase  in I 
requires a larger first-period  private surplus,  which  can be generated  only if 
S  falls  (r rises).  On the other,  as consumer wealth is now lower,  there  is 
reduced  consumption  and increased  savings in the first  period.  Provided  r and 
are aufficiently  close to each  other, it  is reasonable  to suppose  that the 
first effect  dominates  end that the domestic  (real) interest  rate  increases. 
Finally,  we can solve for the effect on  the fiscal  stance: -19- 
(2)  di — (q1  + 8q2)([l 
-  (5/6)]Bd6 -  (D+D0)(dS/8))  > 0 
(a)  (b) 
Note the effects  labeled  (a) snd (b)  which identify  the two sources  of the 
requisite  fiscal  tightening.  First,  earlier  repayment  of foreign  debt 
deteriorates  the government  budget  because  the domestic  real interest  rate 
facing  the government  is higher than the corresponding  one on the external 
debt.  Secondly,  the rise in real interest  rates  implies a secondary  burden  on. 
the government  budget  as long as ggg  domestic  debt is carried  over  ro the 
second  period (D+D > 0)  (Cohen, 1988, p.  88).  On both accounts,  government 
"wealth"  declines,  and  has to be restored  by an increase  in the primary 
surplus.  The  social  welfare  consequences  can be evaluated  by using  an 
equation  like  (9) ,  but  the losses  are already  evident. 
V.  Is There  a Role for Trade Policy? 
Since  debt service  involves  simultaneously  a public-finance  and a 
tranafer  problem,  optimal  government  policy  has two components:  (a)  a real 
depreciation  must be engineered  to generate  an excess  supply  of tradables;  and 
(h) the tax structure  must  be re-designed  to raise the government  resources 
needed for public  debt service  at least cost.  Of course,  as the reel 
depreciation  will,  in general,  interact with the optimal  tax structure,  these 
two steps are not independent.  But conceptually  the internal  transfer 
requires  solving  an optimal  tax problem  of the sort that is familiar  from  the 
public-finance  literature  (e.g. Newbery  and Stern,  1987, chaps.  2-3).  The 
optimal tax structure  thereby  obtained  will not, except  for in rare 
circumstances,  involve  trade  taxes  (see Dixit,  1985). -20- 
But in practice  we are unlikely  to face optimal  tax structures  in place; 
nor is re-optimization  likely  to be easy  with every increase  in  the debt- 
service  burden.  Moreover,  governments  do frequently  resort  to trade policies 
for revenue  reasons,  largely due to their  relative  administrative  ease.  So 
the extent to which trade policies  can be used effectively  to reduce some of 
the welfare  costs  identified  above  should  atill  be of  relevance.  Put 
differently,  it is of interest  to know  if there  are any  arguments  for 
trade  policy  in  the present  context.  In analyzing  this question  below,  I will 
ignore  the interactions  between  trade policies  and distortions  created by 
other  pre-exiating  taxes.11 
It is clear  that  a moderate  level  of  tariffs  can now be welfare 
enhancing.  In the first  instance,  this is becauae  tariffs  raise  revenue  for 
the government.12 But there  is also  a aecond  reaaon  for why tariffs would  be 
beneficial:  by raising  the relative  price  of importables,  tariffa partially 
substitute  for real exchange  rate depreciations.  Put differently,  an increase 
in  tariffs  allows  a smaller  real depreciation  to generate  the same amount  of 
surplus  in traded  goods.  Since  depreciations  are costly  because  they 
deteriorate  the public  sector's  terms  of trade,  this  is another  rationale  for 
the  use of tariffs.  Interestingly,  this rationale  also creates  a role  for 
export  subsidies.  On impact, a subsidy  of course  deteriorates  the 
government's  budget.  But, just like a tariff,  an export  subsidy  reduces  the 
11.  This can  be justified  by considering  that when the pre-exiating  tax 
structure  is not "optimal"  the welfare  effects  of such interactions  could  go 
either  way. 
12.  Edwards  (1988) stresses  the conflict  between tariff  reductions  and fiscal 
adjustment  when tariff  revenuea  are an important  part of government  resources. -21- 
magnitude  of the requisite  real depreciation.  When the subsidy  is targeted  on 
marginal"  exports  with  high supply elasticities,  the second  effect  dominates 
and welfare  is unambiguously  increased.  The present  section demonstrates 
these points. 
We return  to the one-period  model of section  III, but distinguish  now 
between  importables  and exportables.  The modified  model becomes: 
(9)  W — V  - (r) 
(10')  E(1+s,  1+t,  p  V) — (1-r)R(l+s,  l+t, p) 
-  (1--y)B 
(11')  RE_0 







—  yB 
The export  subsidy and the tariff  are denoted by s and t, respectively. 
Notice that the public  sector  budget  has to be adjusted  for tariff revenues 
and subsidy  payments.  In what follows, we perform  comparative  statics  around 
an intial  equilibrium  where s—t—O. 
Consider  first  the role  of export  subsidies.  As before,  we define  the 
real exchange  rate as l/p.13  An instructive  intermediate  result  is obtained 
when we look at the effects  of the subsidy on the real exchange  rate: 
(23)  dp  (R 
- E)(E1 
- 
R1)ds > 0. 
As before,  (R 
-  E) 
is positive.  The  term  (E1 
- 
R1)  represents  the 
increase  in the excess  demand,  or conversely  the reduction  in the excess 
supply,  of the exportable  as the real exchange  rate appreciates  (i.e.  ,  p 
13.  The "effective"  real exchange  rate  would of course  also incorporate  the 
price  effects  of tariffs  and subsidies.  In the present  context,  we want to 
distinguish  between  the effects  of exchange  rate and trade  policies. -22- 
increases),  and we would normally  expect  it to be positive.  Consequently,  the 
effect  of the subsidy  is to increase  p,  or to appreciate  the real exchange 
rate.  The requisite  change  in r  is in  turn given by: 
(24)  dr — (l/R)f((l-r)R1 
-  E1)ds  rRdp} 
The second  term in the square  brackets  is the familiar  terms-of-trade  effect 
from real exchange  rate changes.  Now, however,  this effect goes in the other 
direction,  as the real rate  appreciates.  On this account  alone,  the aubsidy 
allows  a reduction  in r. 
How about  the sign of  the first  term,  ((l-r)R1 
-  E1)?  This term  capturea 
the direct  revenue  effect  of  the subsidy:  there  is a revenue  loss which equals 
the level of exports  (R1 
-  E1),  part of  which is made up, however,  by 
increased  tax revenues  generated  by the higher  market  price of the exportable 
(rR1);  the net effect  is ss expressed  above.  Now since  r — yB/R  (at s'-t—O) 
and  (R1 
-  E1)  +  (R2 
- 
B2) 
— B,  we can show that: 




-  (yrR1/R)) 
-  (R2 
-  B2). 
Since  good 2 is the importable,  (R2 
-  B2)  <  0.  Also,  both y and rR1/R are 
less than  one,  implying  (1 
-  (yrR1/R))  > 0.  Consequently, 
(l-r)R1 
-  Li > 0. 
The implication  is that the sign of  the fiscal correction  expressed  in (24)  is 
indeterminate.  But there is the possibility  that  a small  subsidy  will ease 
the budgetary  burden,  if the price  elasticities  of  the exportable  (see  [23J) -23- 
and the share  of  non-tradables  in GDP (see [24]) are sufficiently  high. 
With a slight  re-interpretation  of our model, we can in fact obtain  a 
more informative  result.  Let us think  of good  one as a specific  exportable, 
rather  than  all exportables.  in  the absence of tariffs  good two then becomes 
a tradable  composite  of other  exportables  and of  the importables.  The export 
subsidy  in question  applies  only to the specific  commodity  singled  out as good 
one.  With this interpretation,  we can investigate  the consequences  of a small 
subsidy  on a subset  of  exportables. 
To fix ideas, consider  a subsidy  on  a  marginal"  exportable,  that is a 
commodity  which at the old relative prices  stood at zero excess  supply. 
Therefore  initially  R1 
-  —  0,  and  it must  be the case that 
(l-r)R1 
-  < 0, 
which  now implies  that  dr/ds  < 0 on account of both terms  in (24).  The 
interpretation  is as follows.  A small  export subsidy  on  commodities  that  are 
at the margin  of being exported  leads  to  negligible  subsidy  payments.  In 
fact, because  it raises  the domestic  market price  of these  commodities,  the 
subsidy  actually  generates  some net revenues.  Consequently,  a targeted 
program  of export  subsidies  can reduce  the budgetary  burden  through  this 
channel  as well as through  the induced effects  of real appreciation.  The 
argument  is of course  generally  valid for all commodities  with small  initial 
shares  in total exports.  Note further  that the welfare  impact of the resource 
misallocation  caused  by a small  subsidy  is of second-order  magnitude,  compared 
to the effect  of the reduction  in  r.  Hence we can conclude  that a moderate 
amount  of export  subsidization  of non-traditional  exports,  particularly  those 
with  high  price elasticities,  is likely  to be desirable  as a complement  to a -24- 
devaluation-cum-fiscal-stringency  package.14 
We can now turn  to tariffs.  The second-best  argument  for small  tariffs 
is similar  to the one sketched  out above for subsidies,  and is of course 
stronger  insofar as tariffs unambiguously  raise  revenue  for the government. 
Starting  once again  from  an intial  equilibrium  with s—t—O,  the response  of  p 
to changes in the tariff  level  is given by: 





The term (E2 
- R2)  represents  the increase in the excess  demand  for  the 
importable  as the real exchange  rate  appreciates  (i.e., p increases),  and it 
is normally  positive.  The effect  on r  is: 
(27)  dr — (l/R)[((l-r)R2 
-  E2)dt 
-  rRdp), 
which  is now unambiguously  negative  since  (R2 
-  E2)  <  0. 
One  final  aspect of 
tra1de policy  worth  discussion  is the role  of 
quantitative  restrictions.  Quotas,  like tariffs,  would  tend to substitute  for 
real depreciations  and would therefore have similar  benefits.  But from the 
present  pespective,  quotas have two important  shortcomings.  First, and most 
obviously,  they generate no direct  revenue  for the government  in the likely 
case of no auctioning.  Secondly,  they  transform  what are essentially  traded 
goods  into non-traded  goods  by breaking  the price  linkages  with foreign 
markets.  Consequently,  a smaller  share  of  net government  revenue remains 
14.  The second-best  package will involve a differentiated  structure  of export 
subsidies,  along the lines  of the inverse-elasticity  rule.  The general  case 
can be worked out by indexing  different  exportables,  and setting  dW/dsi 
— 0 
for each  commodity.  But the general  formulation  yields  no additional  insight. -25- 
"indexed"  to traded  goods  and the welfare  cost of real depreciations  are 
magnified (see equation  [13] and the accompanying  discussion).  For these 
reasons,  a conversion  of quotas  to tariffs will ease the future burden  of  the 
internal  transfer. 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
The conventional  advice  to a country having to generate  a resource 
transfer  abroad  is to depreciate  the home  currency in real  terms.  It is 
frequently  neglected  that such depreciations  tend to have serious consequences 
for the fiscal  balance.  As long as non-tradables  are a net source of revenue 
for the government,  e reel depreciation  amounts  to a real income loss for the 
public  sector,  which  has to be compensated  by a fiscal  tightening  over and 
above  the magnitude  of the external  transfer.  Paradoxically,  by worsening  the 
terms  at which  the government  extracts  resources  out of the private  sector,  a 
devaluation  can  make it harder  for the external  transfer  to be accomplished. 
A rather  similar  outcome  obtains when real interest  rates  are raised  to 
generate  a private  sector  surplus.  The  increased  interest  burden  on the 
government's  domestic  debt amounts  to a terms-of-trade  deterioration  via-a-via 
the private  sector. 
Once the fiscal constraint  is taken  into account,  room  is created  for 
some  unorthodox  policy  combinations.  In particular,  trade policies  that 
supplement  devaluations  by promoting  exports  and restricting  imports  can be 
shown,  when judiciously  employed,  to increase welfare.  These  policies  now 
have a role to  play,  not just  because  they may raiae  revenue  for the -26- 
government,  but because they  allow  a foreign-exchange  surplus  to be 
accumulated  without  exacerbating  the debt-service  burden  in  terms  of domestic 
currency -27- 
APPENDIX 
Suppose  the economy  has n  exportables,  m importables,  and a single  non- 
tradable  good.  Then  the income-expenditure  identity  for the private  sector  is 
given  by: 
(Al)  E(l+s1  l+s,  l+t1  l+tm,  p, V) 
— (l-r)R(l+s1  l+s, l+t1,...,  l+t5, p) 
-  (l--y)B 
The equlibriuni condition  in  the non-traded  goods market  is: 
(A2)  E 
-  R 
0. 
Let Re and Ee denote  the lXn  vector  of partial  derivatives  with respect  to the 
prices  of the exportables,  and s denote  the nxl vector  of subsidy  rates.  Rm, 
Em, and t are defined  analogously.  Then  the government  budget  constraint  is: 
(A3)  iR 
- 
(Re 
-  + 
-  R).t 
— 
Finally,  social  welfare  is defined  by: 
(A4)  W  V 
-  (r) 
To  express  the solutions,  some further notation  is  helpful.  First,  let 
e and Rpe 
stand  for the lxn row vectors  of  cross  derivatives  of exportables 
with respect  to the price  of non-tradables.  Then let Rpm and Rpm 
stand for 
the lxm row vectors of analogous  cross  derivatives  for the importables.  Rae 
and Eee, and  and E  are nxn and mxm matrices,  respectively,  of cross- 
derivatives  within  the exportables  group.  And Rem  Rem are the nxm 
matrices of  cross-derivatives  across  importables  and exportables.  Finally, -28- 
define the following  substitution  matrices. 




-  pe  (lxn) 
5pm 
— 
Rpm  Rpm  (lxm) 
See 
— Ree 
-  ee  (nxn) 
5em — Rem 
- 
Eem  (nxm) 
We can solve  for the second-best  structure  of tariffs and export  subsidies 
using this framework.  When all tariffs  are initially  zero,  for example,  the 
optimal  structure  of export  subsidies  is implicitly  defined  by: 
(AS)  dW — ([A* + (l7)(h/R)]sTs[aSeSpe 
- 
5ee] 
-  ('/R)[((lr)Re 
-  + rRpa;Spe]).ds 
— 0, 
where the superscript  T indicates  the transpose  of a vector.  A* here is the 
social  marginal  utility  of income, and is defined  ss follows: 
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